New Mexico Historical Review
Volume 86

Number 2

Article 5

4-1-2011

Los Alamos in a Way was a City of Foreigners: German-Speaking
Émigré Scientists and the Making of the Atom Bomb at Los
Alamos, New Mexico, 1943-1946
Christoph Laucht

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalrepository.unm.edu/nmhr

Recommended Citation
Laucht, Christoph. "Los Alamos in a Way was a City of Foreigners: German-Speaking Émigré Scientists
and the Making of the Atom Bomb at Los Alamos, New Mexico, 1943-1946." New Mexico Historical
Review 86, 2 (2011). https://digitalrepository.unm.edu/nmhr/vol86/iss2/5

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by UNM Digital Repository. It has been accepted for
inclusion in New Mexico Historical Review by an authorized editor of UNM Digital Repository. For more information,
please contact amywinter@unm.edu, lsloane@salud.unm.edu, sarahrk@unm.edu.

“Los Alamos in a way was a city of foreigners”
german-speaking émigré scientists and the making of the
atom bomb at los alamos, new mexico, 1943–1946
Christoph Laucht

M

any people believe that the creation of atomic bombs at the Los
Alamos Laboratory came solely from American-born scientists such
as Robert Serber, Norris Bradbury, and, in particular, J. Robert Oppenheimer,
the scientific director of Los Alamos.1 But, as nuclear scientist Victor F.
Weisskopf astutely noted, “Los Alamos in a way was a city of foreigners.”2
Perhaps the most important single group of foreigners were German-speaking
émigré nuclear scientists Hans A. Bethe, Felix Bloch, Egon Bretscher, Martin
Deutsch, Otto R. Frisch, Klaus E. J. Fuchs, Maria Göppert-Mayer, Rolf Landshoff, John R. von Neumann, Rudolf E. Peierls, George Placzek, Hans H.
Staub, Edward Teller, and Weisskopf. Despite their relatively small numbers
in the overall effort, German-speaking émigré scientists played a pivotal role
in one of the most significant events in human history: the making of the
atomic bomb during the Second World War. The chief sites of the Manhattan Project, the joint wartime American-British-Canadian nuclear weapons
program, were Oak Ridge, Tennessee; Hanford, Washington; and Los Alamos,
New Mexico. These scientists were especially important to the theoretical
science and weapons engineering conducted at Los Alamos Laboratory.

Christoph Laucht is a lecturer in History at the University of Liverpool, United Kingdom. He
is coeditor of Divided, But Not Disconnected: German Experiences of the Cold War (2010), and
is currently completing a book manuscript on the impact of German-speaking émigré scientists
on British nuclear culture. This article is dedicated to the memory of Timothy Moy and Ferenc
Szasz, who gave invaluable support to the author’s early investigations into the history of Los
Alamos and the atomic age.
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While the history of Los Alamos is well documented, the exceptional
contributions and experiences of the German-speaking émigré scientists as
a cohort have so far remained untold. Their Germanness, particularly their
language and exposure to German culture, distinguished them from their
American-, British-, and Canadian-born colleagues and also had far-reaching
consequences for their motivations, their scientific input, and their lives outside the laboratory in Los Alamos. The New Mexico portion of the émigrés’
wartime saga offers a unique perspective on the history of the Los Alamos
Laboratory.
The fourteen émigrés came to the Hill, as the residents of Los Alamos
called their town, from diverse areas of the German-speaking world. Bethe,
Fuchs, Göppert-Mayer, Landshoff, and Peierls originated from Germany
proper, while Bloch, Bretscher, and Staub arrived from Switzerland. In
addition still other scientists hailed from the old Austro-Hungarian Empire.
Frisch, Deutsch, and Weisskopf were Austrian; Teller and von Neumann
were Hungarian; and Placzek was Czech.3 The majority of these scientists,
especially those who were Jewish, formed part of the Nazi-induced migration
of intellectuals that caused an unprecedented brain drain of Continental Europe.4 For the most part, these nuclear scientists arrived at the secret laboratory
by two routes. Some scientists such as Bretscher, Frisch, Fuchs, Peierls, and
Placzek traveled to Los Alamos as part of wartime British-American-Canadian
cooperation. They were members of the British Mission to the Manhattan
Project. Scientists such Bethe, Bloch, Deutsch, Göppert-Mayer, Landshoff,
von Neumann, Staub, Weisskopf, and Teller found employment in American
universities after their departure from Europe and thus arrived at Los Alamos
as naturalized American citizens.
Most of these scientists pursued considerable parts of their higher education in German universities during the country’s golden age in international
science during the 1920s and 1930s.5 German universities played a key role in
the development of nuclear science. In particular the university preparation
in quantum physics, with a strong theoretical orientation, laid the foundation for the émigrés’ success at Los Alamos.6 Beyond the German-speaking
émigré scientists, other famous staff of the Los Alamos lab received degrees
from German universities. The Ukrainian-born explosives expert George
Kistiakowsky earned a PhD in chemistry from Berlin University in 1925, while
Oppenheimer received a PhD in physics from Göttingen University in 1927.
Several Los Alamos theoreticians studied at one time or another with German
scientist Max Born, a pioneer in the field of quantum mechanics. In addition
to Oppenheimer, the list of students who studied with Born included Fuchs,
Göppert-Mayer, Teller, Weisskopf, and even the Italian Nobel Laureate
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Enrico Fermi. Oppenheimer had further ties to Germany because of both
his and his wife Kitty’s German ancestry.7
The shared experiences of the émigré scientists in both German universities and the country’s centers of nuclear science like Göttingen, Berlin, and
Munich facilitated strong social bonds within the German-speaking émigré
community at Los Alamos. As they joined the project, many of them came
across old friends and former colleagues on the Hill. Peierls felt “a strange
sensation to meet so many old friends from various phases of our lives in such
an outlandish place.”8 In Teller’s words, the Hill represented “an enormous
international reunion of the atomic physics community.”9
Culturally, German-speaking émigrés also differed from their Americanborn hosts and often showed a deeper appreciation of “high culture,”
especially classical music. Frisch and Teller were gifted pianists, and Frisch
even performed weekly concerts for the local radio station KRS. Many of
their American-born colleagues, by contrast, joined the square-dance club,
an expression of their native vernacular culture.10 The same distinction held
true in outdoor activities. German-speaking émigrés enjoyed extensive hikes
and mountain climbing in the Sangre de Cristo and Jemez Mountains—

ill. 1. hans a. bethe, enrico fermi, nick king, and paul teller, 1946
(Photograph courtesy Los Alamos National Laboratory)
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ill. 2. otto r. frisch
Otto Frisch giving a concert
for the local radio st ation,
KRS.
(Photograph courtesy Los
Alamos National Laboratory)

activities enjoyed in the Alps of Germany, Austria, Switzerland, and Italy.
Their American-born counterparts, meanwhile, preferred horseback riding
and exploring Native American ruins in the area.11
Motivations to Work on the Atom Bomb
The personal encounters of the German-speaking émigrés with the oppression, violence, and terror of National Socialism in Germany especially
motivated their work on the atomic bomb. Fuchs, for example, had barely
escaped the lethal clutches of Adolf Hitler’s regime. A known Communist
in the northern German city of Kiel, where he studied in the early 1930s,
Fuchs was forced underground in the immediate aftermath of the Nazi
takeover in January 1933. He boarded the train to Berlin early in the morning after the burning of the Reichstag. The Gestapo came to his apartment
but missed Fuchs by a few hours.12 “I remember clearly when I opened the
newspaper in the train,” Fuchs later remarked on his journey to Berlin, “I
immediately realized the significance and I knew that the underground
struggle had started. I took the badge of the hammer and sickle from my
lapel which I had carried until that time.”13 Fuchs had managed to escape,
but the Gestapo arrested some family members, and the fear drove his sister
Elisabeth to commit suicide.14
German-speaking émigré atomic scientists also lived through intense periods of uncertainty about the fate of family members or loved ones who had
stayed behind in Germany or Nazi-occupied parts of Europe. Frisch’s parents
remained in his native Vienna, and after the Anschluss, when Nazi Germany
annexed Austria, his father was deported to a concentration camp. Decades
after the war, Frisch still remembered the months that followed his father’s
arrest as “a confused nightmare in my memory.” Luckily, he was released
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from captivity, and his parents emigrated to Sweden.15 Hitler’s rise to power
also affected Peierls’s family. While his brother, father, and stepmother managed to leave Germany, he lost relatives who could not immigrate. To make
matters worse, Rudolf and Genia Peierls were separated from their children,
when they were evacuated from England to Canada as a safety precaution in
the summer of 1940.16 The impact of the European war on German-speaking
émigré scientists was visible to their American-born hosts. Jane Wilson, the
wife of scientist Robert Wilson, stated, “The war would come very close to
an American even if he were on top of a mesa in New Mexico, when his
[émigré] host, listening to a radio broadcast on fighting in Hungary, said
simply, ‘My family is there.’”17
Apart from these personal experiences with the National Socialist regime,
many of the German-speaking émigrés at Los Alamos personally knew atomic
scientists who were still practicing science inside the Third Reich and who,
they believed, were working on an atomic bomb. Bloch, Fuchs, Peierls,
Placzek, Teller, and Weisskopf all had been either students or colleagues of
Werner Heisenberg at Leipzig University in the late 1920s and early 1930s.
Heisenberg was now playing a key role in the German nuclear weapons
project.18 Peierls even listed Heisenberg as a reference shortly after his arrival
in the United Kingdom in 1934.19
The German-speaking émigré scientists, with their knowledge of the brilliant scientists available to Hitler and their direct experiences with his regime,
worked with a greater sense of urgency to complete the atomic bomb than
did their British-, American-, and Canadian-born colleagues. Their exposure
in 1940 to the Luftwaffe’s heavy bombardment of Britain prior to Germany’s
planned but aborted invasion of the British Isles made the German military
threat more real and imminent for those German-speaking scientists who
would later join the Manhattan Project.20 After the war, Frisch explained
that he had suffered from a “depression” at the time: “I had a pretty strong
presentiment that I had only got a few more months to live—so strong that
for once I really believed it.”21
It was this urgency that led Frisch and Peierls to compose their seminal
“Frisch-Peierls Memorandum” in February 1940. In the document, the two
physicists suggested that building a nuclear weapon was technically feasible,
initiating a serious British nuclear weapons program with far-reaching
consequences for the Manhattan Project.22 Peierls also collaborated with
Fuchs to draft reports on atomic-related German-language publications,
the activities of nuclear physicists inside the Third Reich, appointments of
scientists at German universities, and science-related issues in Germany.23
Peierls carried on with this scientific-intelligence work during the war and
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ill. 3. los alamos, new mexico, trading post, october 1945
(Photography courtesy Churchill Archives Centre, Bretscher Papers, BRER
A.62.a/0418)

ill. 4. big house, october 1945
(Photography courtesy Churchill Archives Centre, Bretscher Papers, BRER
A.62.a/0417)
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provided James Chadwick, a chief scientist and administrator in both the
British atomic weapons program and later the Manhattan Project, with a list
of physicists working inside Germany who might conduct nuclear weapons
research. This list included the names of Werner Heisenberg, Karl Wirtz,
Manfred von Ardenne, and Paul Harteck.24
Born, an émigré who had found refuge in Edinburgh, Scotland, summed
up the shared predicament of the dislocated scientists. He stated that scientists
such as Fuchs were “not only prepared, but extremely keen” to be involved in
the war effort, “as their fate entirely depends on the victory of this country.”
That characterization also applied to German-speaking émigré atomic scientists across the Atlantic.25 In the United States, Americans were also alarmed
that German nuclear scientists might construct a nuclear weapon giving
Hitler unimaginable destructive power. As a consequence, in August 1939,
three Hungarian-born scientists, Leo Szilard, Teller, and Eugene Wigner,
convinced physicist Albert Einstein, the father of the General Theory of
Relativity and a German émigré to the United States in 1933, to sign a letter addressed to Pres. Franklin D. Roosevelt. The so-called Einstein letter
warned the president about the possibility of a German atomic bomb in the
near future.26
In addition to the three scientists directly behind the famous Einstein
Letter, Bethe, Placzek, and Weisskopf also showed great concern about
the prospect of an atomic bomb in Hitler’s hands. Decades after the war,
Weisskopf said, “I have often wondered what our attitudes would have been
had we known that there was no seriously competitive Nazi effort toward a
bomb.”27 The émigré scientists’ personal experiences with National Socialism
translated into a determination to finish a bomb before the Germans; this
drive sometimes reached a state of obsession. Jay Wechsler, who worked as
Frisch’s assistant in early 1944, recalled an episode during a Saturday night
that clearly revealed his boss’s dedication and work ethic. Frisch’s group had
come up with the idea to use film rolled around a motor in a dark room as a
high-speed camera to photograph an implosion. The ideal time to perform
the test was, of course, at night. Although it was Saturday night and Wechsler
was playing in a band and had a few beers, Frisch, well known for his fondness
of Los Alamos night life, came to the dance and urged Wechsler to join him
in the laboratory. After Wechsler’s initial protest, he finally gave in and met
Frisch at the lab, where the two stayed until the experiment’s completion
the next morning.28
The strong determination of the German-speaking émigré nuclear scientists was not limitless. While V-E day did not significantly impact the scientists’
motivation to complete their mission, the moral and ethical implications of
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ill. 5. t-124, the first apartment building egon bretscher’s family
lived in at los alamos, new mexico, october 1945
The Bretscher family was housed in the bottom left apartment. Other families
who lived in the building were those of Robert Brode (top left), Cyril Smith
(top right), and Edward Teller (bottom right).
(Photography courtesy Churchill Archives Centre, Bretscher Papers, BRER
A.62.a/0419)

their work confronted them for the first time after the Trinity test of 16 July
1945 in the New Mexican desert. Bethe summarized the ambiguous feelings
many of his colleagues expressed after they witnessed the atomic explosion:
“It was awesome. We had calculated it all, and we knew pretty well what
would happen, and still it was a tremendous impression when it really did
happen.”29 Peierls recollected “the feeling of awe at the terrible power of
this weapon mixed with elation at the success of the work.”30 By December
1945, after the successful Trinity test and the subsequent atomic bombings
of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, Peierls noticed an “amazing deterioration of
morale” at Los Alamos.31
Scientific Contributions
The émigré scientists’ personal experiences with National Socialism motivated them to take leading roles in the creation of nuclear weaponry. They
leveraged their education in Germany, with its strong theoretical orientation,
to gain a disproportionately high number of senior administrative posts in
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the top level of scientific management at Los Alamos. Their elite positions
within the laboratory indicate that the émigré scientists were an invaluable
asset to the atomic bomb project.
Bethe, perhaps the most important German-speaking scientist at Los Alamos, headed one of the laboratory’s initial five departments, the Theoretical
Division, or simply T-Division. On 1 March 1945, Oppenheimer even appointed Bethe as a member of the “Cowpuncher Committee,” which oversaw
the final stages of the implosion project. Besides his senior administrative
roles, Bethe made further pivotal contributions to the project. Shortly before
the Trinity test, his calculations refuted his colleagues’ fears that an atomic
explosion might set the entire earth’s atmosphere on fire.32
In the laboratory’s administrative hierarchy, group leaders stood one step
below division leaders. All German-speaking members in the British Mission,
except Fuchs, held positions as group leaders after the laboratory’s reorganization in August 1944 (Bretscher, F-3: “Super Experimentation”; Frisch,
G-1: “Critical Assemblies”; Peierls, T-1: “Implosion Dynamics”; Placzek,
T-8: “Composite Weapon”). Their positions underlined the high caliber
of the British Mission in general and its German-speaking émigré atomic
scientists in particular. Among the British team members, Placzek’s case was
special. Although he was a member of the British Mission, he had worked
at Cornell University before he joined the Manhattan Project in Montreal,
Canada, where he led the Theoretical Physics Division. In May
1945, he transferred to Los Alamos.
Placzek, who was a distinguished
expert on neutron diffusion theory,
directed a newly formed group
within the Theoretical Division
that worked on the science required
to create a combined plutoniumuranium weapon. Shortly after the
war, Placzek replaced Bethe as the
head of a reformed T-Division.33

ill. 6. egon bretscher (left)
and mr. peña (right), january
1946
(Photography courtesy Churchill
Archives Centre, Bretscher
Papers, BRER A.62.a/0710 )
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Some German-speaking group leaders, including Staub, Weisskopf, and
Teller, did not come to Los Alamos as members of the British team. Staub
initially worked in the Experimental Physics Division, where he led a team
that focused on the improvement of counters. In September 1943, Staub’s
group was combined with Bruno Rossi’s group. This new laboratory group,
headed by Rossi, was known as the Detector Group. This team later developed
instrumentation that recorded and monitored the implosion diagnostics for
Robert Serber’s RaLa (radiolanthanum) method. Both Weisskopf and Teller
worked in the Theoretical Division. Weisskopf, who was also known as the
“Los Alamos Oracle” because of his successful reliance on his intuition,
headed the T-3 group (“Experiments, Efficiency Calculations, and Radiation
Hydrodynamics”). Bethe acknowledged Weisskopf’s talent and appointed
him deputy chief of the Theoretical Division. In March 1945, Weisskopf also
began work as a consultant for the Trinity test.34
Among the group leaders, Teller represented an exceptional case. During his early days at Los Alamos, he served as leader of the T-1 group that
investigated “Hydrodynamics of Implosion and Super [bomb].”35 Teller was
perhaps the most controversial scientist at Los Alamos. He was disappointed
when Oppenheimer chose Bethe over him to head the T-Division. The fact
that the Hungarian-born scientist had also become increasingly obsessed with
the idea of a hydrogen bomb, the so-called Super, and had ceased to follow
orders from Bethe and Oppenheimer further alienated him from the laboratory’s scientific director. As a consequence of the strained relationship, Oppenheimer revoked Teller’s status as head of the T-1 group and assigned him
to lead a team in the so-called Fermi Division in September 1944. Although
Teller had to report directly to Oppenheimer, this appointment enabled Teller
to pursue his ideas on the Super and thus to start thermonuclear weapons
research at Los Alamos.36
Peierls, who assumed the leadership of Teller’s former group in the Theoretical Division, gained authority among the group leaders when he was appointed director of the British Mission after Chadwick received orders to go
to Washington, D. C. Besides Peierls and, in particular, Bethe, experimental
physicist Frisch was perhaps the most significant German-speaking émigré
on the Hill. With his so-called Dragon Tail experiment, Frisch proved that
the uranium bomb, code-named “Little Boy,” would work and thus obviated
the need for a test detonation. Given the limited amount of fissile material
available at the time, Frisch’s experiment was priceless to the Manhattan
Project.37
In August 1945, the émigré scientists contributed significantly to the compilation of a technical history of the laboratory in the style of the German
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ill. 7. edward teller with his
son paul at tsankawi, new mexico,
november/december 1945
(Photography courtesy Churchill
Archives Centre, Bretscher Papers, BRER
A.62.a/0509)

Handbuch der Physik (Physics Handbook).
This high level of involvement in the Los
Alamos publication is yet another indicator of the émigrés’ scientific expertise and
stature. In all they edited five of the twentyfour volumes of the Los Alamos Technical
Series: Bethe (Blast Wave), Frisch (Critical
Assemblies), Peierls (Theory of Implosion),
Placzek (Neutron Diffusion Theory), and
Weisskopf (Efficiency).38
While these five nuclear scientists had firmly established themselves in
their fields by the time they joined the Manhattan Project, others like Fuchs
and Deutsch had not yet achieved high professional standing. In 1984 Fuchs
suggested in one of his very few interviews that many of his colleagues had
praised him, along with Richard Feynman, as the most gifted junior scientist
at Los Alamos.39 Fuchs’s report on the scaling for blast waves, for example,
has been widely influential since he drafted it during his stay on the Hill.40
In 1945 Norris E. Bradbury replaced Oppenheimer as scientific director of
the Los Alamos Laboratory. Bradbury held Fuchs’s skills in such high esteem
that he requested the budding physicist stay at Los Alamos until after the first
U.S.-postwar atomic tests in 1946. In the summer of 1946, the British, who
had also realized his talent, demanded his immediate return to the United
Kingdom to resume work on their nuclear-energy program.41
Apart from their individual contributions, German-speaking émigré
nuclear scientists, as a cohort, helped shape a new approach to nuclear
physics that combined the traditional “German” preference for theory with
the British and American leaning toward experimentation. The Germanspeaking scientists were also exposed to the Italian Fermi School at Los
Alamos. Both the school’s founder and Emilio G. Segré, who studied under
Fermi at the University of Rome, worked at Los Alamos. This synthesis of
British, American, German, and Italian approaches toward science, led to the
formation of a new style of nuclear research built on the close cooperation
of theoreticians and experimentalists. Bethe’s T-Division, which housed a
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large number of German-speaking émigrés, was pivotal in forging this new
methodology because, as Bethe said, it “had to do with practically everything
in the laboratory.”42 Historian Paul K. Hoch appropriately calls the Germanspeaking émigré atomic scientists “bridge-builders” because they fused a
connection between German, British, and American research cultures.43
This new interdisciplinary approach bore fruit perhaps most visibly in the
plutonium- implosion bomb project. In this enterprise, success depended
on three prerequisites. First, the scientists committed themselves to working
under tremendous pressure and a tight schedule to achieve their goal of
beating the Third Reich in the race for the atom bomb. Second, their project
required and received abundant financial support from government sources.
And third, theoreticians needed to collaborate closely with experimentalists,
who possessed the ability to transform plans into material realities, since the
design of atomic weapons called for the application of highly specialized
engineering skills.44
In the early days of the Manhattan Project, the plutonium-implosion
program was regarded as only secondary to the development of the gunassembly method that would be used to trigger a nuclear reaction within
the uranium bomb, which was, by contrast, easier to detonate. Despite the
Manhattan Project’s early inclination to engineer a uranium bomb, Bethe,
Peierls, Teller, and, in particular, von Neumann still devoted considerable
attention to the plutonium-implosion program. Not until the summer of 1944,
however, did the laboratory pursue the implosion principle on a grand scale.
After a group working under Segrè, which included Deutsch, discovered
that pile- or reactor-produced plutonium emitted five times more neutrons
than anticipated, Los Alamos’ primary mission changed fundamentally and
even prompted the lab’s reorganization. This spontaneous fission meant
that a gun-type plutonium weapon would predetonate, or “fizzle,” before
it reached critical mass rather than igniting a nuclear explosion. Implosion
seemed to offer a promising solution to the crisis. The realization that the
gun-assembly method would not work for the plutonium bomb altered the
overall mission of the implosion program at Los Alamos. The laboratory’s
implosion research had previously explored the possibilities of detonating
both a uranium and plutonium bomb with an implosion system. Now the
implosion program focused exclusively on a plutonium-implosion bomb. In
response the program working on a gun weapon now concentrated solely on
uranium.45
Given that the basic principles of gun assembly were understood at the
time, the laboratory’s primary aim thus changed to exploring the hitherto
uncertain and only theoretical implosion principle. Fortunately, the Los
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Alamos Laboratory had followed a method of simultaneously pursuing a
variety of approaches and experiments to speed progress toward an atomic
weapon. This practice enabled scientists to achieve a fluid mission change at
Los Alamos. While the making of the atom bomb was chiefly an engineering
task, well-trained engineers would have been unable to produce a fission, let
alone an implosion bomb, without the scientific input of theoreticians such as
Bethe, Fuchs, von Neumann, Peierls, Teller, and Weisskopf.46 Although von
Neumann did not permanently reside at Los Alamos, he helped advance work
on the implosion principle in major ways, and Bethe consequently placed
him in the triumvirate alongside Fermi and physicist Neils H. D. Bohr as “the
greatest intellects at Los Alamos.”47 The product of this new methodology, in
which scientists worked closely with engineers, was the so-called “Fat Man”
device that was successfully tested near the town of Socorro, New Mexico,
on 16 July 1945. Von Neumann first proposed the idea of testing the implosion bomb to Teller in late 1943. Notwithstanding the risk of squandering a
good deal of the extremely valuable plutonium, von Neumann’s suggestion
found many advocates when it was openly debated in January 1944.48 The
German-speaking émigrés’ wartime mission, along with that of the other Los
Alamos scientists, ended with the Trinity test.

ill. 8. palace of the governors, santa fe, new mexico
Hanni Bretscher (left) in front of the Palace of the Governors, Sant a Fe, New
Mexico, July 1945.
(Photography courtesy Churchill Archives Centre, Bretscher Papers, BRER
A.62.a/0103)
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Secrecy, National Security, and Suspicion
The émigrés’ Germanness had a reciprocal effect on their lives and work.
While their German-speaking backgrounds proved a crucial prerequisite for
their scientific achievements, it also caused the laboratory’s security regime
to monitor closely the émigré scientists and their families. Largely as the
result of acute fears of German espionage, a culture of secrecy and security
dominated their professional and private lives to the point that they literally
lived a “goldfish existence,” as journalist Marie Kinzel described in 1946.49 In
an ironic twist, many German-speaking émigré scientists who had escaped
Fascism and Nazism in Europe found themselves confined to a military post
where their American hosts regularly suspected them of spying for Germany.50
The secrecy surrounding the Manhattan Project affected future residents
of Los Alamos long before they arrived on the Hill. The Manhattan Project’s
security restrictions forbade recruits from telling anybody where they were
going. Most of them literally vanished from the corridors of their university
departments. Los Alamos scientists only revealed where they worked after
the bombing of Hiroshima. In a letter to the Secretary of the Society for the
Protection of Science and Learning, a British aid organization for displaced
scientists and scholars, Frisch explained the reasons behind his disappearance: “In November 1943, I became a British Subject and was immediately
sent to the United States, where I have been working . . . at the big research
establishment at Los Alamos, New Mexico . . . as described in Dr. Smyth’s
Report on ‘Atomic power for military purposes.’”51
The journey to the Hill proved especially difficult for members of the British Mission, who had to cross the Atlantic, infested by German submarines,
on the first leg of their tour. Once within the continental United States, they
usually traveled by train to Lamy, New Mexico, just like their American
peers did. The émigré scientists then proceeded to the Manhattan Project’s
undercover front office at 109 East Palace Avenue in Santa Fe. Oftentimes a
member of the Women’s Auxilary Corps (WAC) would then drive the scientists to Los Alamos in the Jemez Mountains.52 Manhattan Project administrators had chosen Los Alamos, formerly a boys school, because of its isolated
location on mesas overlooking the Rio Grande Valley.53 Once they reached
the secret laboratory, the scientists and their families confronted even tighter
security measures. While the German-speaking émigré scientists commonly
received a warm welcome by their American and German colleagues, they
were placed under special scrutiny by the laboratory’s security organs.54
As at the other Manhattan Project facilities, the ubiquitous culture of
security that dominated the entire operation was naturally apparent at the

spring 2011

laucht N 237

Los Alamos Laboratory. The Manhattan Project’s security culture especially
utilized the military policy of compartmentalization. This principle, which
aimed to prevent espionage by separating both the Manhattan Project as a
whole and individual installations like the Los Alamos Laboratory into small
compartments, generated a good deal of conflict between the scientists and
the military leadership. Owing to tensions with Oppenheimer and his frustration with the organization of the laboratory, Bloch, like American scientist
Edward U. Condon, decided to leave Los Alamos before the wartime mission
was completed.55
The compartmentalization policy often prevented laboratory staff from
knowing with whom they were working and sometimes drove them to perform
“detective work” in order to obtain information about their colleagues. In
one case, Jay Wechsler, who worked under Frisch, conducted research in the
technical library at Los Alamos to find out about his boss and learn what kind
of weapon they might be developing.56 Not all Los Alamos scientists, however,
strictly adhered to compartmentalization protocol. Unlike American-born
scientists, married German-speaking émigrés such as Bethe, Peierls, Teller,
and Weisskopf commonly told their wives about the purpose of their stay on
the Hill and even discussed crucial issues with their spouses.57
While the strict compartmentalization applied to all laboratory staff regardless of their rank and ethnic background, some security measures particularly
angered German-speaking scientists. The many mechanisms of laboratory
security, including barbed wire, fences, patrol dogs, and watch towers, elicited
mixed emotions among émigrés, particularly in those scientists like Fuchs
who had experienced Fascist or National Socialist persecution or internment in Britain. Wartime residents of the Hill thus sometimes sarcastically
referred to Los Alamos as the “Concentration Camp Project.”58 Staub posed
the legitimate question to fellow Los Alamosans: “Are those big tough MPs,
with their guns, here to keep us in or to keep the rest of the world out?”59
Teller, who had encountered anti-Semitism in both Hungary and Germany,
remarked on the Hill’s security measures: “The first thing that I noticed on
arriving was that we were all going to be locked up together for better or for
worse. . . . Los Alamos, I soon realized, gave one a new appreciation of grass
and strangers.”60 After the war, a French paper echoed those sentiments when
it cynically compared wartime Los Alamos to a concentration camp of Nobel
laureates.61
In their prison-like environment, German-speaking scientists suffered
what scholar Thomas Elsaesser appropriately refers to as a “two-fold estrangement.” First, they underwent traumatic separation from their homelands.
Second, some military and civilian authorities suspected them of spying for
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the Third Reich.62 In most cases, their heavy German accents were the chief
marker of their otherness. Staub’s accent proved problematic, for example,
during a return journey from California to Los Alamos. After receiving the
standard security briefing, the Swiss-born physicist boarded an Albuquerquebound plane but then vanished off the radar of the security services. Upon
reaching Albuquerque, he simply asked for the way to the restroom, but his
thick accent caused passengers to suspect that Staub was a Nazi agent. The
passengers called the local police who arrested Staub for further interrogation. Staub followed the directives of his security handlers and refused to
answer any questions or give the police his identity. Meanwhile, his now
unsanctioned absence at Los Alamos sparked a manhunt. The investigation
led security agents to an unidentified inmate, who fit Staub’s description, at
an Albuquerque jail, and he was set free and brought back to Los Alamos.63
Göppert-Mayer also encountered problems with the Manhattan Project’s
security organs. Despite being a naturalized American, the army denied Göppert-Mayer full security clearance. Teller had to accompany her to Washington,
D.C., to retrieve data on temperature ranges for the calculations that she was
assigned to perform for the Los Alamos Laboratory. When she received the
requested figures, Göppert-Mayer was shocked by the extremely high temperatures that were expected in the top-secret experiment. The experiment studied
the opacity of uranium in order to avoid an accidental formation of a critical

ill. 9. klaus e. j. fuchs’s
security badge photo
(Photograph courtesy
Los Alamos National
Laboratory)

ill. 10. edward teller’s
security badge photo
(Photograph courtesy
Los Alamos National
Laboratory)
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mass that would have resulted in an unintended
nuclear explosion. No one had informed her about
the wider implications of her work.64
Paradoxically, in a scientific community set up
to help safeguard the survival of the free world,
the U.S. Army censored almost every aspect of
the scientists’ private and public communications.
During the Second World War at Los Alamos, all
telephone calls and all mail were subject, respectively, to monitoring and censorship. The army
assigned false names to the elite atomic scientists
in order to obscure their identities: Oppenheimer
became James Oberhelm, Teller became Ed Tilden, and Bethe became Howard Battle. The only ill. 11. hans h. staub’s
languages permitted for postal correspondence security badge photo
apart from English were French, German, and (Photograph courtesy
Italian. The military leadership mandated that Los Alamos National
foreign scientists conduct their phone calls in Laboratory)
English. This policy impeded the ability of several
German-speaking scientists to communicate with their colleagues, friends,
and families. The army also required that émigrés use only English in public
places like Santa Fe.65 The security measures sometimes had a ludicrous
effect on everyday life in Los Alamos. In 1947 journalist Alden Stevens

ill. 12. victor f. weisskopf’s
security badge photo
(Photograph courtesy Los Alamos
National Laboratory)

ill. 13. john von neumann’s
security badge photo
(Photograph courtesy Los Alamos
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pointed out, “[I]n one of the most convivial towns in the country there was
no conviviality.”66
Gen. Leslie R. Groves, the Manhattan Project’s commanding officer, and
his security agency did not show the slightest trace of humor when faced
with security breaches. When a guard at a POW camp in Santa Fe tried
to impress prisoners with a story about a super-weapon of unprecedented
destructive force being built on the mysterious fenced-in mesa nearby, he
was interrogated by the Federal Bureau of Investigation and immediately
dispatched to the Pacific theater of operations. Only after Hiroshima did the
members of his guard unit learn about the reason behind his quick transfer:
his speculation had come too close to reality.67
Despite the tight security measures at Los Alamos, Fuchs managed to pass
on sensitive nuclear data to the Soviet Union and thus ended the United
States’ atomic monopoly. Groves later called the Fuchs case, which evolved
into one of the biggest spy scandals of all times, the “most disastrous break in
security” within the entire Manhattan Project.68 The German-born scientist
managed to evade army intelligence because of a policy that dictated foreign
scientists would be monitored within the perimeter fence of the Los Alamos
Laboratory but left unwatched off-site. U.S. security services relied on their
British colleagues to vet Fuchs, who maintained a low profile during the war
to cloak his dealings with the Russians in a veil of secrecy. In 1949 a report
by the British security service MI5
explained Fuchs’s successful strategy:
“His existence [had] in effect [been]
that of a mathematical machine.”69
Fuchs’s espionage confession
in 1950 confirmed, in retrospect, the
suspicions many Americans held during the war about the likelihood of

ill. 14. hans staub’s daughters
mutzi (left) and biba (right)
with tilano (center), edith
warner’s san ildefonso
partner, who helped warner
run her small restaurant at
otowi bridge, january 1946
(Photography courtesy Churchill
Archives Centre, Bretscher Papers,
BRER A.62.a/0714)
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German-speaking émigré atomic scientists passing allied secrets to the Nazis.
This postwar sentiment, however, contradicted the historical record because
Fuchs had never spied for the Third Reich and the Soviet Union had been
an ally during the war. The anti-Communist passions sweeping the country
after the war elevated Fuchs into a household name and cast a long shadow
over the legacy of many German-speaking émigré atomic scientists who spent
time at Los Alamos both during and after the war. The Fuchs tale resonated
throughout American popular culture and inspired Hollywood films like
Jerry Hopper’s The Atomic City (1952) and Russell Rouse’s The Thief (1952),
as well as spy novels like Martin Cruz Smith’s Stallion Gate (1986), Joseph
Kanon’s Los Alamos (1997), and Quinn Fawcett’s Death to Spies (2002).70
In the early 1990s, a Santa Fe-based company even planned guided tours
through northern New Mexico locales related to the Fuchs case.71
Conclusion
While interest in the Fuchs espionage affair has remained highly popular in
late twentieth-century popular culture, the public’s awareness of the Germanspeaking émigré atomic scientists’ saga faded with their departure from the
Hill shortly after the war. Many émigré scientists, however, would always
remember Los Alamos. Their stay in New Mexico marked an important
stepping-stone in their careers. After the war, Bethe, Bloch, and GöppertMayer won Nobel Prizes. Von Neumann gained fame as one of the leading
figures in the emerging postwar field of computer science. Although often
critical, Teller received publicity from his leading role in the creation of thermonuclear weapons, for his testimony in the Oppenheimer security hearings,
and for his contributions to Pres. Ronald Reagan’s Strategic Defense Initiative
(SDI), sometimes referred to as “Star Wars.” Other German-speaking émigré nuclear scientists returned to university positions. Weisskopf joined the
faculty at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT) and also served
on the board of the European Organization for Nuclear Research (CERN)
in Geneva, Switzerland. Placzek became a member of the Institute for Advanced Study located in Princeton, New Jersey, before he died prematurely
in 1955. Deutsch joined the Physics Department at MIT and discovered the
“exotic atom” system positronium, which is an atom that exists for only a
fraction of a nanosecond. In a rare case of re-emigration, Staub returned to
his native Switzerland, where he became director of the Institute of Physics
at the University of Zurich. Peierls and Frisch returned to Britain and pursued academic careers that eventually led to professorships at the prestigious
universities of Oxford and Cambridge, respectively. After Fuchs returned
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to the United Kingdom, he headed the Theoretical Physics division at the
British Atomic Energy Research Establishment (AERE) located in Harwell
near Oxford. Bretscher also worked for the AERE, where he first directed
the Chemistry Division and later the Nuclear Physics Division. In early
1950, Fuchs confessed to spying for the Soviet Union and served nine years
in a British prison. After his release in 1959, he immigrated to the German
Democratic Republic to become deputy director of the Institute of Nuclear
Research in Rossendorf near Dresden.
Many of the émigré scientists launched impressive postwar careers, and
their pathbreaking wartime work at Los Alamos, which only became visible
after the war, shifted the very field of nuclear science toward Big Science.
This type of research includes ample funding by one or more national governments and the private sector, the interdisciplinary collaboration of hundreds
of international scientists, large-scale machinery, and enormous laboratories.72
The émigré scientists accelerated the formation of Big Science and therefore
contributed to the creation of what Pres. Dwight D. Eisenhower labeled “the
military-industrial complex” in 1961.73
The émigrés’ wartime work also led to the advent of thermonuclear
arms after the war. The development of these super weapons plunged the
nuclear age into even more potentially destructive depths and eclipsed all

ill. 15. dances at the san ildefonso church, january 1946
Peter Bretscher (left) and Mark Bretscher (right) are in the foreground.
(Photography courtesy Churchill Archives Centre, Bretscher Pape rs, BRER
A.62.a/0706)
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other projects on the U.S. atomic agenda, such as harnessing nuclear power
for civilian or commercial uses. Bethe, Bretscher, Fuchs, Göppert-Mayer,
Landshoff, von Neumann, Staub, and especially Teller, who became known
as the father of the hydrogen bomb (H-bomb), all made pivotal contributions
to the research and design of thermonuclear weapons.74 During their time at
Los Alamos, Fuchs and Bretscher gained insight into fundamental aspects of
H-bomb design and accumulated valuable knowledge for their subsequent
work on the British thermonuclear project at the AERE.75 On the regional
level, the work of the émigré scientists helped transform New Mexico into
a major hub of worldwide science. The number of scientists living in New
Mexico dramatically increased after the war. With the enlargement of the
Los Alamos Laboratory and the establishment of new research institutions, in
particular the Sandia National Laboratories in Albuquerque, scientists now
found an unprecedented number of job opportunities outside the university.76
As much as their presence on the Hill influenced the progress and outcome
of the Manhattan Project, the scientists’ temporary hometown and its surroundings also left a strong impression on them about American cultural life and
the majestic New Mexican landscape. Scientist Robert Brode’s wife Bernice,
a resident of Los Alamos, underlined the Hill’s uniqueness. She suggested that
the peculiar locale perhaps shaped numerous émigrés’ first impressions of the
United States in a way that led them to false conclusions about American life.77
Despite all the hardships and the emotional estrangement of living far from
their homelands and loved ones, the Land of Enchantment also fascinated
some of the scientists. Bretscher gushed, “The natural beauty of N.M. appeals
to me so much that I am quite in love with the place.”78 Although most of the
German-speaking émigré nuclear scientists had left the Hill by the summer
of 1946, they nonetheless left behind an impressive legacy.
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